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THE SUSPECT POPULATION AND
DNA IDENTIFICATION
Richard Lempert*

Forensic DNA analysis typically proceeds by first determining whether
alleles1 found in DNA apparently left by the perpetrator of a crime at a crime

scene2 (the "evidence sample") match alleles extracted from a sample of the
suspected criminal's blood (the "suspect sample"). If alleles drawn from the
two sources match, the next step is to provide information about the probative
value of the match by estimating the probability that alleles extracted from the

blood of some random individual would have matched the alleles in the

evidence sample. This probability estimate is typically made by estimating
the frequency with which specific alleles are found in some population and
combining these frequencies according to the product rule.3 Obviously, a match

?Richard Lempert is Francis A. Allen Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School, and Professor and Acting Chair of the Department of Sociology at the University of
Michigan. He was a member of the National Research Council's Committee on DNA Technology
in Forensic Science.
1. An allele is "one of two or more alternative forms of a gene." Committee on DNA

Technology in Forensic Science, National Research Council, DNA Technology in

Forensic Science 167 (1992) (hereinafter NRC Report). The 4'alleles" used in most forensic
work, however, consist of DNA fragments that are not thought to include any genes. Indeed, the
fact that these DNA fragments have no bearing on an individual's traits allows for much greater
variability in the DNA. Thus, in the forensic context, the term * 'allele'' merely refers to fragments
of DNA that can be distinguished from one another in the laboratory.
2. Less frequently the issue will be whether alleles extracted from organic material found

on the suspect or his possessions match a victim's alleles.
3. According to the product rule, the probability of two independent events equals the
probability of the first event times the probability of the second; with n independent events the
separate probabilities of each of the n events are multiplied together to give the probability of their
joint occurrence. Thus if the probability that a person had allele A = 1/10 and the probability
that he had allele B = 1/10 and the probability that he had allele C = 1/10, and if the probability
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between a suspect's DNA and evidence DNA provides less reason to believe
that the suspect is guilty if many people share the suspect's DNA profile than

if few people do.
Although the validity of the techniques that forensic scientists use in
matching suspect to evidence DNA is generally accepted,4 the application of the
product rule to determine the evidential weight of a DNA match has generated
considerable dispute. In particular, analysts have argued that given population
substructure, allele frequencies estimated on the basis of a laboratory's refer?
ence sample may understate the allele frequencies in the ethnic group to which
the defendant belongs and configurations of alleles, as estimated by the product
rule, may underestimate the probability that these configurations would be
found in specific subpopulations.5 Apparently for these reasons, forensic labo?
ratories have estimated allele frequencies for Caucasian defendants by refer?
ence to the allele frequencies found in a Caucasian population data base, allele
frequencies for blacks by reference to the allele frequencies found in a black
population data base, and allele frequencies for Hispanics by reference to allele

frequencies found in an Hispanic population data base.6
If population substructure is the reason why allele frequencies for defen?
dants of different gross ethnicities are estimated on the basis of allele frequen?

cies in same-ethnicity data bases, then the effort made is inadequate, for the
racial categories used are so general that considerable population substructure

continues to exist within racial categories. Population subgroups subsumed
under these socially-defined ethnic categories may be characterized by very
different allele frequencies for alleles of different lengths at the loci tested.
Yet the population substructure problem is often not serious. The fact that
a suspect is a member of a highly inbred group with allele frequencies quite
different from those found in a reference data base ordinarily does not matter.

Indeed, no problem a t all will arise unless the "suspect population," which
is to say the group of people who plausibly might be suspected of having

that the person had one of these alleles was not affected by whether or not he had either or both
of the others, the probability that the person would have alleles A, B, and C would be 1/10 x 1/

10 x 1/10, or 1/1000.
4. A report by the National Research Council recommends that courts should judicially

notice the validity, in principle, of the currently most common laboratory procedure for detecting
DNA variation, single-locus probes analyzed on Southern blots. For a description of this and other

techniques of DNA analysis, see NRC Report, supra note 1, at ch. 2.
5. Compare Richard C Lewontin & Daniel L. Hard, Population Genetics in Forensic

DNA Typing, 254 Science 1745 (1991) and Joel E. Cohen et al, Forensic DNA Tests and

Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium, 253 Science 1037 (1991) (comment on Devlin et al., 249 Science
1416 (1990)) with Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic

Work, 254 Science 1735 (1991) or Neil J. Risen & B. Devlin, On the Probability of Matching

DNA Fingerprints, 255 Science 717 (1992).

6. Today laboratories commonly provide juries frequencies from different ethnic data bases
rather than just the frequencies among a defendant's coethnics. This information is apparently
provided as a step toward conforming with a recommendation in the NRC Report, supra note 1.
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committed the crime, contains members of the same inbred group.7 The point
is easy to intuit. Assume that a rape has occurred in a particular town and that
the potential suspects (the only people the local police are likely to investigate
and arrest) all live within twenty miles of the town. If the person who is arrested

is a member of an inbred Indian tribe, and is the only member of that tribe
living within a thousand miles of the scene of the crime, allele frequencies
within his tribe play no role in determining the probability that another person
left the evidence DNA. Because (with some very high probability) the only
persons who might have left the evidence DNA are members of the suspect
population, allele frequencies within that group are what determine the possi?
bility that some other plausible suspect might have left the evidence DNA.8 If,
7. When I originally drafted this Article, this point had not been made in the literature,
except imprecisely in an unelaborated allusion by a prosecutor. James Wooley, A Response to
Lander: The Courtroom Perspective, 49 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 892 (1991). Moreover, several
important articles at that time implicitly assumed that the proper population database consisted
of a sample of defendant's coethnics. Lewontin & Haiti, supra note 5; Cohen, DNA Fingerprinting
for Forensic Identification: Potential Effects on Data Interpretation ofSubpopulation Heterogene?

ity and Band Number Variability, 46 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 358 (1990); E.S. Lander, Population
Genetic Considerations in the Forensic Use of DNA Typing, in Banbury Rep. 32: DNA Technol?

ogy and Forensic Science 1436 (J. Ballantyne et al. eds., 1989). Additionally, the standard

procedure then was to base allele estimates for Caucasians on a Caucasian database, for blacks
on a black database, etc.
Such is the march of science and the delays in finding a publisher that the point has now been
recognized by a number of authors. Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 5; Bruce S. Weir, Population

Genetics in the Forensic DNA Debate (review), 89 Proc. Nat'l Aca d. Sei. USA 11,654 (1992);
Richard C. Lewontin, Which Population? Getter to the editor), 52 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 205
(1993). The justifications for again making the point are that most work recognizing this issue
has appeared in technical scientific journals that lawyers and judges seldom read; that the scientists

who have made the point have not at the same time considered, as I do below, the implications
of the presence of the defendant's relatives in the suspect population or focused specifically on
the attributes of that population; and because, in the words of a reviewer for this journal with

whom I hope the reader will agree, "the exposition here is concise and incisive, and some
reiteration is probably useful.''
8. Jonathan Koehler, in a thoughtful paper, argues that the appropriate reference population
is the "source population'' consisting of those who might have been sources of the evidence DNA
rather than the "suspect population." He points out correctly that not all potential sources need
be suspects, offering the example of DNA extracted from hair found in a bed at a murder scene
that could have come from the victim's husband who died a week before the victim was killed

and so is not a suspect in the case. Where, however, specific plausible sources are not suspects,
as in Koehler's hair example, the possibility that they left matching DNA should be explicitly
investigated and eliminated; little is to be gained by including people like them in some larger
population data base. Thus, if eyewitness evidence indicates that the suspect in the murder de?
scribed above is white and the victim's husband is black, the jury should learn the probability that

a match would be found in the DNA of a white person sampled at random and, assuming the
evidence DNA matched the suspect's DNA, whether the husband's DNA also matched.
From another perspective almost anyone could be a source. The killer in our example may
have flown to New York City from Oslo and flown back unsuspected once his crime was commit?

ted. But to include all possible sources in the source population would usually yield far less
appropriate frequency estimates than those based on the population of plausible suspects.
Koehler also argues that it may have been impossible for a suspect to have left the evidence
DNA, but he can offer only an implausible example (a woman suspect who plants a man's semen
in a woman she murdered to frame the man for the crime). Moreover, where a suspect before
DNA testing is known to have been incapable of being the source of evidence DNA yet remains
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in our example, the suspect population was a mixed Caucasian population, a

mixed Caucasian data base would provide the appropriate estimate of the
defendant's uniqueness within the group of plausible suspects, however com?
mon his allele configuration was among his tribal peers.
The situation is similar when some small proportion of the suspect popula?
tion shares the defendant's particular ethnic heritage. Even if alleles that match
the defendant's are substantially more common among his ethnic peers than
within the suspect population, there is little reason for concern if allele frequen?
cies have been conservatively estimated (e.g., by binning criteria) in the first

instance. If the bulk of the suspect population were Caucasians of mixed
ancestry, use of a mixed Caucasian data base to estimate allele frequencies
would be appropriate. The probability that a Caucasian would match the defen?

dant's allele configuration might be much lower than the probability that a
member of the defendant's ethnic group would match. However, the probabil?
ity that a random member of the suspect population would match the defen?
dant's allele configuration would be much like that probability among Cauca?
sians since Caucasians dominate the suspect population. Although the presence
of some persons who shared the defendant's ethnic heritage would make the
match probability based on a Caucasian data base an underestimate of the true
probability, the magnitude of the underestimate should not be so great that it
would not be offset by the use of conservatively estimated allele frequencies
in the first instance.
As the proportion of the suspect population that belongs to the defendant's

particular ethnic group increases, the attention that must be paid to allele
frequencies within that group also increases. When, for example, the suspect

population consists of 50% Caucasians and 50% fellow ethnics, the sample
used to generate estimates of the probability that a randomly selected member
of the suspect population might have left the evidence DNA should be com?
posed of half Caucasians and half fellow ethnics if allele frequencies within
these two groups are meaningfully different. This composition is indicated
whether the defendant is an ethnic group member or a Caucasian.

This analysis does not mean, however, that the use of a black data base

is, for example, appropriate if a white man is arrested for rape in a black
ghetto. The suspect population consists of those who are plausible suspects
given those factors that condition suspicion. If a rape victim claims her assailant
was white, the police are not going to arrest a black-appearing man for the

crime no matter how many black men would have been potential suspects
a suspect, the legal system has a good handle on the problem. For these reasons I will continue
to speak of the "suspect'' rather than the "source" population as the appropriate reference group
for estimating allele frequencies. As a practical matter little is likely to turn on this distinction,
for in most cases the group of plausible DNA sources and the group of plausible suspects will
be identical or there will be known plausible sources (e.g., rape victims' husbands) who should
be specifically eliminated as sources of evidence DNA. See Jonathan Koehler, Error and Exagger?
ation in the Presentation of DNA Evidence, 34 Jurimetrics J. 21 (1993).
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absent information about the defendant's race. The suspect population will
consist of white-appearing males, and the data base used to estimate the unique?
ness of a defendant's allele configuration should reflect that fact.

A suspect population can consist largely of one particular ethnic group
when, for example, either living patterns or some other information about a
criminal limits potential suspects to those of a particular ethnicity. Thus allele
frequencies found in a mixed Caucasian reference sample might misestimate
the uniqueness (within the group of plausible suspects) of the DNA of a Cauca?
sian defendant who is a member of an ethnically homogenous isolated commu?
nity within which a rape occurred. Similarly, allele frequencies found within
an American black reference sample might misestimate the uniqueness (within
the group of plausible suspects) of the DNA of a West Indian black defendant
arrested in a black ghetto, if the victim's description of her assailant meant that
only men with West Indian accents were vulnerable to arrest. Whether such
misestimates will in fact occur, and their likely magnitudes if they do occur,
are empirical questions. Perhaps the degree of misestimation is unlikely to be
great, and conservative estimates of allele frequencies in the first instance may
provide defendants with sufficient protection against the possibility that the

different composition of reference samples and suspect populations would
lead to underestimated allele frequencies. In some actual cases, however, the
precise identification of the suspect population and the use of allele frequencies
found in it may be important.9
9. See, e.g., United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted,
vacated, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc); State v. Passino, No. 185-1-90 Fcr (Dist. Ct.
Franklin County May 13, 1991). Each case involved a Native American defendant and a crime
in which a substantial proportion of the suspect population shared the defendant's tribal heritage.

Bruce Weir and Ian Evett, two of the forensic world's most perspicacious commentators on the
statistics of DNA identification, wrongly criticize the judge in Passino for suggesting the FBI's
data bases may not have been appropriate for finding the probability of a coincidental match. They

write,

Once a match has been declared between the DNA profiles of crime-scene material
and a suspect, the FBI calculates the frequency of that profile in the population.
This calculation is to provide an indication of how likely it would be to find that

profile in a random member of the population. In State v. Passino, the court
apparently was not told that these calculations are of interest only under the hypothe?

sis that the crime-scene material came from someone other than the suspect. If the
suspect did not provide the crime-scene material, then his ethnic background is
quite irrelevant. (If he did provide the crime-scene material, then there is no need
to consider random members of the population.)

Bruce S. Weir & Ian W. Evett, Whose DNA? Getter to the editor), 52 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 869

(1992).

Their mistake, which echoes that of Wooley, supra note 7, whom they cite, is to fail to
recognize that the ethnic composition of members of the suspect population is potentially important
if it is likely to differ substantially from that found in the FBI's available data bases. See Lewontin,

supra note 7. Moreover, the suspect's ethnic background while technically irrelevant if allele
frequencies representative of the suspect population are used, matters in practice because the harm
of misidentifying the suspect population or of lacking access to a data base that is representative
of allele frequencies in the suspect population is potentially greatest when the defendant shares
the ethnicity of the suspect population. Thus, in evaluating the probability th at DNA was left by
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The situation is different, however, if people within the suspect population
have allele configurations across the loci tested with a relatively high probabil?
ity of matching that of the defendant. Often the suspect population will include
such people; they are the close relatives of the defendant. Not only are such
people likely to live in the same vicinity as the defendant, but they are also
likely to share some of the characteristics (e.g., general appearance, accent,

mannerisms) that made the defendant a suspect in the case. Although the
probability may be quite low that the DNA of a randomly selected member of
the suspect population would match the defendant's DNA at the tested loci,
the probability will be substantially higher that at least one member of the

suspect population has matching DNA, because the alleles of relatives are
not randomly distributed with respect to those of the defendant. Where, for
example, a DNA profile consists entirely of very rare alleles so that the proba?
bility of a random match across several loci approaches zero, the probability
that two brothers will match at two loci is about 6% and at four loci about
. 3 %.10 In these circumstances, to present a legal factfinder with match probabil?
ities based on the assumption that no systematic association is present between

the defendant's DNA and the DNA of other members of the suspect population

is misleading.
Thinking in terms of suspect populations reveals that often there is little
reason to be concerned that a defendant's ethnic group is poorly represented

in a laboratory population data base. However, when a defendant's close
relatives are members of the suspect population, statistics based on applying
the product rule to allele frequencies taken from a laboratory's population data
base will be misleadingly low, and extremely so, if they purport to reflect the
likelihood based on the DNA evidence alone that some person other than the

defendant might have left the evidence DNA. The statistics will not be as
misleadingly low if they purport to represent the likelihood that a person
randomly selected from the suspect population would have tested alleles match?

ing those of the defendant, because in a large population a relative of the
defendant would be unlikely to be chosen by chance.
The random selection probability is not, however, the statistic that is

a white man arrested on an Indian reservation, the proper allele data base would be one representa?
tive of reservation Indians. But, if a Caucasian data base were used, the allele frequency estimates
probably would be as or more favorable to the defendant than they would have been had a proper

suspect population data base been used, since a person's alleles are likely to be more common
among his coethnics than among members of some other ethnic group. Thus, a Caucasian defendant
in this case is unlikely to be prejudiced by the use of a data base that does not represent the suspect
population. If, however, the defendant were a Native American living on the reservation, he would

probably be disadvantaged by the use of a Caucasian rather than a suspect population data base
to estimate allele frequencies. Weir and Evett's mistake is explainable because they focused only
on the trial judge's concern with the defendant's Native American heritage. By itself this is
unimportant; it becomes important when it is considered in conjunction with the ethnic composition

of the suspect population.

10. See NRC Report, supra note 1, at 87.
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central to the factfinder's decision making. The key issue for the factfinder
concerns the chance that other potential suspects have matching alleles. With
DNA evidence as the only evidence in the case, this is a function of the number
of potential suspects and the probability that a member of the suspect group
possesses matching DNA. Random probabilities of matching allele configura?
tions are often so low that even though the group of potential suspects may be
much larger than the group of close relatives, the probability that at least one

person has matching DNA will be larger, and sometimes considerably so,
for the group of relatives than for the group of unrelated suspects. In these
circumstances relatives in the suspect population must be treated separately
from unrelated individuals.11
Finally, at least until DNA data bases come on line, a substantial amount

of non-DNA evidence ordinarily will link a defendant whose DNA is tested
to the alleged crime. This evidence, which is unlikely to similarly implicate
other members of the suspect population, is often essential for concluding that
a defendant with DNA matching the evidence DNA is uniquely linked to the
crime.12 When the non-DNA evidence is strong, neither population substruc?
tures nor the presence of relatives is likely to create a large risk of injustice.

But where the non-DNA evidence is weak or where that evidence would as

strongly implicate related others, as an identification based on appearance and
accent might, the cautions mentioned above are essential if the DNA evidence
is to be given its proper weight and justice to be done.

11. A similar argument can be made in principle where the suspect population includes a
small proportion of people who share the defendant's ethnicity and a larger group who do not.
However, because the probability of matching alleles will be much lower for an unrelated member
of the defendant's ethnic group than for a relative of the defendant, if the number of coethnics
in the suspect population is small compared to the number of other ethnics, the probability that
at least one other potential suspect has DNA matching the defendant's may be larger in the group
of other ethnics than it is in the group of co-ethnics.
12. For those accustomed to thinking in Bayesian terms, the certainty with which such
evidence suggests the defendant's guilt may be thought of as a Bayesian prior probability that the

DNA evidence modifies.
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